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Abstract— Benford's Law shows the pattern of behavior in
normal systems. It states that in natural systems digits'
frequency has a certain pattern such that the frequency of
numbers' first digits is not evenly distributed. In systems with
natural behavior, numbers begin with a "1" are more common
than numbers beginning with "9". It has many applications in
forensic accounting, stock market, finding abnormal data in
survey data, and natural science. It implies that if the
distribution of first digits is outside of the expected distribution
it can be indicative of fraud. In this paper, we investigate
whether bots and Information Operations’ activities conform
to this law. Our results showed that Bots’ behavior do not
adhere to Benford's Law, suggesting that using this law helps
in detecting malicious online accounts and activities on social
media. However, activities related to Information Operations
did not show consistency in regards to the number distribution.
Our findings shed light on the importance of examining
regular and anomalous online behavior to avoid malicious and
contaminated content on social media. This is the first attempt
in investigating automated accounts and Information
Operations’ activities in terms of adherence to the law of
digital fraud.
law
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I. INTRODUCTION
Benford's Law is an auditing tool for fraud detection.
Fraud detection in social media is gaining increase attention
and studies resolve the issue by machine learning
techniques. Benford’s law applies to accounting forensics
[1], finance [2], survey data [3], natural science [4], and
religion [5]. According to this Law, digits' frequency has a
certain pattern such that the frequency of numbers' first
digits is not evenly distributed. In systems with natural
behavior, numbers begin with a "1" are more common (more
than six times as frequent) than numbers beginning with "9"
[6]. Therefore, the probability that the first digit of a number
is one is about 30 percent, whereas the probability of nine
being the first digit is 4.6 percent. Table 1 shows the
probabilities of all digits 0 to 9 in each of the first four places
in any number. In this study, we apply this law to the
anomalous behavior in online social media including
activities of bots and Information Operations (hereafter IO).
The word "bot" is derived from the word "robot", which
is defined as automated agents that function on an online
platform [7]. They are computer programs that are
persistent, autonomous, reactive, run continuously,
formulate decisions, and activated by itself [8]. There are
various typologies known for bots including Webrobots,
Chatbots, Spambots, Social bots, Sockpuppets, Trolls, and
Cyborgs [9]. In this study, we use datasets containing
Spambots, Social bots, and Trolls, because research shows
that 15% of Twitter traffic are created by bots [10].
Webrobots are used for crawling the Internet and
1
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information retrieval. Chatbots are usually engaged in
natural conversations with humans [9]. Therefore, the
purpose of Webrobots and Chatbots incite different
definition and operation for them, and they do not need to
be detected. Whereas, other typologies have different
definitions which causes them to be leveraged for malicious
purposed, for example spreading misinformation or
impersonating other people. Therefore, we run our analysis
on datasets containing Spambots, Social bots, and Trolls.
IO run by influence campaigns try to manipulate online
discussions are becoming a serious concern [11]. There are
studies dedicated to analyze these campaigns in terms of the
discourse they are involved in, their dynamics, and influence
measurements [11][12].There is no prior study on
examining IO activities in terms of following digital fraud
patterns as they are understood to be malicious and
malevolent activities.
In this study, we investigate whether the activities of
automated agents and IO conform to the law of naturallyoccurring systems. Table I provides the frequencies and
probabilities of each digit for normal systems. To
accomplish this, we conducted two sets of analyses of four
datasets for social bots and seven datasets originating from
state-backed information operations 1 . To the best of our
knowledge, there is lack of research on applying Benford's
Law to bots' activities as well as IO activities. It is important
to know these activities because they are very common and
are growing. We are trying to know whether social bots' and
IO activities adhere or deviate from the law of normal
systems and behaviors. Therefore, we address two research
questions:
RQ1: Do Information Operations and social bots'
activities adhere to Benford's Law?
TABLE 1. EXPECTED FREQUENCIES BASED ON BENFORD'S LAW
Digit

1st place

0

2nd place

3rd place

4th place

.11968

.10178

.10018

1

.30103

.11389

.10138

.10014

2

.17609

.19882

.10097

.10010

3

.12494

.10433

.10057

.10006

4

.09691

.10031

.10018

.10002

5

.07918

.09668

.09979

.09998

6

.06695

.09337

.09940

.09994

7

.05799

.09035

.09902

.09990

8

.05115

.08757

.09864

.09986

9

.04576

.08500

.09827

.09982

Our research objective is to see whether bots and IO
characteristics follow the Benford's Law. Our study

contributes to the research by finding out whether malicious
online activities adhere to a law which exists in natural
systems. We found out that bots’ activities show
nonconformity to the Benford’s law. However, trolls’
activities do not show a consistent pattern.
II. MOTIVATION
Social networks have made the world smaller and people
closer to each other. Services like Twitter, Facebook, and
Instagram have provided a ubiquitous service to connect
people. Nowadays most individuals use social media for
entertainment, getting news, and other various purposes.
Therefore, they are exposed to overwhelming information
spread from both human and automated agents. Bots are
responsible for significant proportions of online activity.
While Subramanian and colleagues [13] found out that
about 8.5% of all Twitter users were bots, other studies show
16% of Twitter traffic is generated by bots [14]. They also
play a major role in disseminating hyperpartisan "fake
news", particularly during special events like elections [15]
[16]. Further, bots can impersonate real people and deceive
the audience. Therefore, it is important to know how pattern
of bots' activities look like.
IO is run with the purpose of interfering in foreign countries'
affairs. Thus, there is a need to understand these activities
more in order to be able to detect them and tackle their
consequences. In this study, we assume that both these
activities are fraudulent, and seek to understand them better
in terms of their conformity to the law of normal behaviors.
Further, this study contributes to the field of cyber security
by understanding online spammers especially because both
can be used for propaganda and public opinion
manipulation.
A. Theoretical basis
Benford's Law is an auditing tool for fraud detection. In
states that in systems with natural behavior, numbers begin
with a "1" are more common (more than six times as
frequent) than numbers beginning with "9" [1]. Therefore,
the probability that the first digit of a number is 1 is about
30 percent, whereas the probability of 9 being the first digit
is 4.6 percent. It shows that in systems with normal
behaviors for a digit d the formula for predicting its
frequency p is as follows:
𝟏𝟏
𝑷𝑷(𝒅𝒅) = 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 (𝟏𝟏 + )
(𝟏𝟏)
𝒅𝒅
According to this Law, digits' frequency has a certain
pattern such that the frequency of numbers' first digits is not
evenly distributed. In systems with natural behavior,
numbers begin with a "1" are more common (more than six
times as frequent) than numbers beginning with "9" [1].
Therefore, the probability that the first digit of a number is
one is about 30 percent, whereas the probability of nine
being the first digit is 4.6 percent. Table 1 shows the
probabilities of all digits 0 to 9 in each of the first four places

in any number. We start with the law of first significant digit
for the first digit:
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅 = 𝒅𝒅)
= 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒅𝒅−𝟏𝟏 ) 𝒅𝒅 = 𝟏𝟏, 𝟐𝟐, … , 𝟗𝟗

(𝟐𝟐)

The law of second significant digit states that:
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏 𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅 = 𝒅𝒅)
𝟗𝟗

= � 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 (𝟏𝟏 + (𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 + 𝒅𝒅)−𝟏𝟏 )

𝒅𝒅

𝒌𝒌=𝟏𝟏

= 𝟎𝟎, 𝟏𝟏, 𝟐𝟐, … , 𝟗𝟗

(𝟑𝟑)

Therefore, the general form of the law is:

𝒕𝒕
� = 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝒕𝒕 𝒕𝒕 ∈ [𝟏𝟏, 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏) (𝟒𝟒)
𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
Mantissa of a positive real number is defined as the unique
𝟏𝟏
, 𝟏𝟏) with 𝒙𝒙 = 𝒓𝒓 ∗ 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝒏𝒏 for some integer n
number r in [𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 �𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 ≤

𝒕𝒕
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 �𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 (𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃 𝒃𝒃) ≤ � = 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 𝒃𝒃 𝒕𝒕
𝒃𝒃
∈ [𝟏𝟏, 𝒃𝒃)

𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝒕𝒕
(𝟓𝟓)

Therefore, the general significant-digit law looks like:
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷(𝑫𝑫𝟏𝟏 = 𝒅𝒅𝟏𝟏 , … , 𝑫𝑫𝒌𝒌 = 𝒅𝒅𝒌𝒌 )

𝒌𝒌

= 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 [𝟏𝟏 + (� 𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊 ∗ 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏

𝒌𝒌−𝒊𝒊

−𝟏𝟏

)

(𝟔𝟔)

𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟 𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚 𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩 𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 𝐤𝐤, 𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚 𝐝𝐝𝟏𝟏 ∈ {𝟏𝟏, 𝟐𝟐, …, 9} and
dj ∈ {0,1, …, 9}, j=2, …, k

Using Benford's law for the first two digits is more
common in fraud detection and is more reliable than
considering only the first digit [17]. Following is the
common formula for the law for the first two significant
digits:
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷(𝑫𝑫𝟏𝟏 𝑫𝑫𝟐𝟐 = 𝒅𝒅𝟏𝟏 𝒅𝒅𝟐𝟐 ) = 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 �𝟏𝟏 +

𝟏𝟏
�
𝒅𝒅𝟏𝟏 𝒅𝒅𝟐𝟐

𝑑𝑑1 𝑑𝑑2 ∈ [10,11, … ,98,99]

(𝟕𝟕)

III. RELATED WORK

In this section, we give an overview of studies on social
bots, trolls and IO, and Benford’s law applications.
Bots. Studies on bot detection mainly leverage machine
learning techniques to improve the performance of bot
detection, understanding [18], characterizing [19], and
classifying them [20] [21]. For example, bot detection
studies have leveraged graph-based features [22] [23],
contextual information [24], sentiment analysis [25],
temporal features [10], and hybrid feature sets [26].
Additionally, there are studies on classifying and
characterizing bots which introduce typologies and
taxonomies of bots in order to provide a better
understanding of them [27] [9]. Additionally, there are realtime bot detection platforms like Debot [10], BotOrNot [26],
and BotWalk [28]
Trolls. Research in the area of trolls is more toward
finding out what trolls are trying to disseminate, especially
during election or other political events [16][29], and how
they participate in online discourse to manipulate the public
opinion [11]. Trolls are considered a specific type of

accounts called sockpuppets run mainly with political
purposes [9]. This is the first attempt to examine troll’s
activities in terms of conformity to online fraud pattern.
Benford’s Law. The first article published on Benford’s
Law was written by Simon Newcomb when he observed the
beginning pages of the book were more frequently used and
worn out compared to the last pages. He discovered that
other scientists used tables with lower numbers than tables
with higher numbers, concluding that numbers with lower
digits are more frequent than numbers with higher digits. He
came up with a probability formula for any non-zero first
digit [30]:
1

P(d)=Log10(1+ )
𝑑𝑑

Where p is the probability for digit d. For more empirical
evidence and explanation about the Benford's law and its
bases see [17]. Initially, Newcomb’s article did not receive
much attention, likely due to a lack of theoretical
explanation [1]. After 50 years, physicist Frank Benford
realized the same pattern that the first few pages of his books
were more worn out than the last pages. He also asserted that
the numbers beginning with low digits are more common.
Thus, he came to the same conclusion and tested his
hypothesis by collecting and analyzing more than 20,000
observations from various sources like areas of rivers and
atomic weights of elements [31]. Therefore, Benford’s law
is sometimes referred to as Newcomb-Benford's Law [32].
Benford's Law has variety of applications in stock market
[33], natural sciences (such as physics, astronomy,
geophysics, chemistry, and so forth) [34], world religions
[5], finance [2], tax returns [34], and social networks [35].

TABLE II. BOTS' DATASETS AND THEIR FEATURES
Datasets

Features

Socialhoneypot content
polluters

Number of followers, number
followings, number of tweets

of

Socialhoneypot legitimate
users

Number of followers, number
followings, number of tweets

of

Socialspambot fake
followers,
Socialspambot1,
Socialspambot2,
Socialspambot3,
Traditionalspambot1,
Traditionalspambot2,
Traditionalspambot3,
Traditionalspambot4

Statuses count, number of followers,
number of following, number of
favorites, number of listed

ZafarGilani

Statuses count, number of favorites,
number of replied

TABLE III. TROLLS' DATASET. THESE ARE TWITTER ELECTIONS
INTEGRITY DATASET. TWITTER BELIEVES THESE ACCOUNTS ARE PART OF
STATE-BACKED INFORMATION OPERATIONS.
Dataset
Bangladesh
Iran 2320
Iran 770
RIRA
Russia 416
Venezuela 1196
Venezuela 764

Number of users
15
2311
771
3608
416
1196
755

Number of tweets
26214
4447056
1122936
8768633
765246
8961788
984980

IV. DATA
We analyze the behavioral pattern of social bots and IO
on Twitter because these accounts are widespread and play
a major role in misinformation spread in online social
media. In order to accomplish this, we collected datasets on
bots and trolls from different resources to run our analysis
on them. For examining social bots we collected 10 datasets
including Texas A&M Social Honeypot [36],
Socialspambot annotated by Cresci and colleagues [37], and
Twitter bots datasets by [18].
For analyzing IO activities, we gathered 7 collections of
Twitter integrity datasets released by Twitter on February
8th, 2019. Twitter believes that these accounts originate from
state-back Information Operations and therefore, suspended
the accounts. It contains 25,076,853 tweets from 2009 to
2018. There are 3613 accounts connected to Russia Internet
Research Agency (RIRA), 770 accounts originate from Iran,
15 accounts come from Bangladesh, 2320 accounts in a
separate collection originate from Iran, 416 accounts from
Russia, 1196 accounts from Venezuela, 764 accounts in a
separate set from Venezuela.
We run the analysis for both human accounts and bots
accounts. We focus on following count, follower count,
favorite count, reply count, retweet count in analyzing all
datasets except for ZafarGilani's datasets because they have
follower_following_ratio rather than separate following
count and follower count. In ZafarGilani's dataset there is
only follower to friend ratio, statuses count, favorites count,
retweet count, and reply count and therefore, we exhibit the
results for bots and humans across these features. We run
the analysis for both human and bot accounts.

V. ANALYSIS AND METHODS
For testing how the data fits the Benford's distribution
(test of goodness-of-fit), we use Pearson's chi-squared test,
Mantissa Arc test, Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD), and
Distortion Factor to ensure the robustness of the results.
Pearson chi-squared test: the first step in this test is to
calculate the chi-squared test statistic, 𝜒𝜒 2 . It shows a
normalized sum of squared deviations between observed
and theoretical frequencies. Second, we need to calculate
the degrees of freedom of the statistic. Since we consider
all of the 9 possible digits, the degrees of freedom will be
9-1=8. The null hypothesis is that the data follows the
Benford's distribution [33]. The test statistic is calculated
using this formula:
𝜒𝜒 2 (8) = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1

(𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 −𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 )2
𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏

(8)

• Mantissa Arc test (MAT): for a positive real
1
number x, Mantissa is the unique number r in [ ) with
10,1
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑟𝑟 ∗ 10𝑛𝑛 for some integer n [17]. More details about
Mantissa is in the theory section (section A). In MAT, each
data point xi is mapped to a unit circle with the following
coordinates:
𝑥𝑥 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = cos(2𝜋𝜋 ∗ (log10 ( 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1))

(9)

𝑦𝑦 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = sin�2𝜋𝜋
∗ (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙10 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1)�

(10)

The reason behind having modulus 1 is that we only
need to take the right side of the decimal point. The center
of the unit circle is called mean vector and its coordinates
are calculated using following equations (actually average
of data points' coordinates):
𝑥𝑥 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =

∑𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 cos(2𝜋𝜋 ∗ (log10 ( 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1)
𝑁𝑁

𝑦𝑦 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =

∑𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 sin(2𝜋𝜋 ∗ (log10 ( 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1)
𝑁𝑁

(11)
(12)

If the mean vector (center of the circle) is at (0,0),
mantissas of the data points are uniformly distributed on
the unit circle. The length of the mean vector is shown by
L2, and therefore the test statistic for MAT is defined as
[38]:
2 ×𝑁𝑁

𝑝𝑝 − 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 = 1 − 𝑒𝑒 −𝐿𝐿

suggesting that legitimate accounts conform to the
Benford’s law distribution, whereas bots’ statistics do not.
For Bots’ account features all tests showed nonconformity
(Table V). In order to examine the real accounts’ activities,
we tested two datasets and results suggests conformity for
real accounts (Table IV).

(13)

Fig. 1. First digit distribution for fake followers (left) and genuine
accounts (right) for their followers. These accounts are from Crecsi 2017
dataset [37]. As can be seen, the distribution does not conform to the law.

The null hypothesis is that the data is uniformly
distributed, and the degrees of freedom is 2. For further
detail on this test see [38].
• Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD): this test
calculates the average deviation of data points (OBSi) from
Benford's data points (BENi). The MAD test statistic is:
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 |𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 |
=
𝑘𝑘

(14)

As Nigrini suggests, the cutoff point for nonconformity to Benford's distribution is MAD ≥ 0.002 ,
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝜖𝜖 [ 0.0018, 0.0022] as marginally acceptable
conformity, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝜖𝜖 [ 0.0012, 0.0018] as acceptable
conformity, and MAD ≤ 0.0012 as close conformity
[38].

Fig. 2. First digit distribution for statuses counts for bots (left) versus
genuine accounts (right)

• Distortion Factor (DF): this test checks whether the
data points are overstated (positive number) or
understated (negative number). For example, the DF
value of 0.0054 suggests that the numbers are overstated
by 54 percent. Thus, it calculates the difference between
the actual mean (AM) and expected mean (EM) [38]. Its
test statistic is:
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 =

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸

(15)

VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Bots’ results. In Socialhoneypot [20] and Socialspambot
[37] datasets we have the statistics for bots as well as
genuine accounts. Therefore, we compare the results for
both across the features. Fig 1, Fig 2, and Fig 3 illustrate the
results for follower count, statuses count, and following
count for bots and humans in Socialhoneypot dataset,

Fig. 3. First digit distribution for following count for bots (left) versus
genuine accounts (right).

We use three tests on datasets and the results of these
tests are not coherent sometimes. For example, in
Socialspambot1 for the statuses count feature, two tests
(Pearson’s Chi-squared and Mean Absolute Devian)
showed nonconformity and only MAT indicated conformity
(Table VI). In these cases, we chose to use a voting strategy
and decided based on the result of the majority of tests as
well as looking at the visual results. Additionally, it is said

that in testing Benford’s law we should not rely only on pvalue because even the real data does not conform to
Benford’s distribution perfectly [38].

features. Further research is needed to investigate the
attributes of communications across these features for bots
versus humans. Detailed results of tests for bots and humans
in ZafarGilani’s dataset are shown in Table VII.

TABLE IV. REAL ACCOUNTS’ FEATURES AND THEIR CONFORMITY TO THE
BENFORD’S DISTRIBUTION
dataset
Legitimate
users
Genuine
accounts

Features
Following
Follower
Statuses count
Favorites count
Following
Follower
Statuses
Favorites count

Adherence to Benford’s law
2 tests Conformity
2 tests Conformity
All tests conformity
Does not exist for this dataset
2 tests conformity
2 tests conformity
All tests conformity
All tests conformity

TABLE V. FEATURES OF BOTS AND THEIR CONFORMITY TO THE
BENFORD’S LAW
Features
following
Follower
Statuses count
Favorites count

Adherence to Benford’s law
Nonconformity
Nonconformity
Nonconformity
Nonconformity

Fig. 4. Statuses count for bots (left) versus humans (right) tweeting
behavior in Zafar Gilan’s dataset

TABLE VI. EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENT TEST RESULTS FOR STATUSES COUNT
IN SOCIALSPAMBOT1 DATASET
Test

Result

Pearson’s Chisquared test

X-squared = 66.365,
df = 8, p-value = 2.59
e-11
L2 = 0.001894, df = 2
, p-value = 0.1531
0.024

Mantissa Arc Test
Mean Absolute
Devian

Final decision on
the test
Nonconformity

Conformity
Nonconformity

For the bots collection by Zafar Gilani and colleagues
[18], we tested follower to following ratio, statuses count,
favorite count, retweet count, and reply count. Fig. 4, Fig. 5,
and Fig. 6 show the results for Zafar Gilani’s dataset. For
human accounts, chi-square and MAD tests show
nonconformity to the distribution, whereas MAT shows
conformity for tweeting behavior and therefore, we use the
voting strategy and mark it as nonconformity. Therefore,
while
tweeting,
retweeting,
replying,
and
follower_friend_ratio behavior does not represent
conformity, favoriting shows conformity. For bot accounts,
tweeting, replying, and favoriting show conformity, while
retweeting
and
follower_friend_ratio
exhibit
nonconformity.
In fact, in this dataset, both bots and humans exhibit
similar and unexpected behaviors. We argue that these
results might be due to their data collection. In their data
collection, Zafar Gilani manually categorize bots and
humans using a team of four people and based on that data
collection they get their results for the characterization of
bots versus humans [39]. Another reason might be that they
collected the tweet behavior of accounts and they consider
tweeting, replying, and mentioning as a single action and
therefore, their graph is more of a communication graph. In
contrast, other datasets have a static snapshot of the
accounts' features rather than communication graph

Fig. 5. Favoriting behavior for bots versus humans in Zafar Gilani’s
behavior

Fig. 6. Replying behavior for bots versus humans in Zafar Gilani’s dataset

investigating the use of this law as an underlying tool for
auditing online world, rising this question "Are all activities
not conforming to Benford's law classified into malicious
activities?" or "Can Social media platforms use Benford's
Law as a solely tool to detect and suspend the accounts?".
VII. CONCLUSION

Fig. 7. Follower_following_ration for bots (left) and humans (right) in
Zafar Gilani’s dataset

Table VII. Test results for ZafarGilani’s dataset
Accounts
Bots

Humans

Feature
Following
Follower
Statuses count
Favorites count
Retweet count
Reply count
Follower_following_ratio
Following
Follower
Statuses count
Favorites count
Retweet count
Reply count
Follower_following_ratio

Test result
Does not exist
Does not exist
1 test nonconformity
1 test nonconformity
nonconformity
conformity
nonconformity
Does not exist
Does not exist
2 tests nonconformity
All tests conformity
nonconformity
2 tests conformity
nonconformity

Our findings of IO activities show none of them conform
to Benford’s law for follower count. While following count
for Venezuela, Iran770, and RIRA exhibit conformity to the
law, the rest of them do not. Regarding like count,
Russia416, Venezuela764, Iran770, Venezuela1196,
Iran2320, and Bangladesh represent conformity. Reply
count statistics for Russia416, Iran770, Venezuela1196,
Iran2320 adhere the law. Retweet count behavior
Russia416, Venezuela764, Iran770, Venezuela1196,
Iran2320, conform to the law and only Bangladesh does not.
In other words, we cannot say all trolls’ activities deviate
from the Benford’s law distribution.

We analyzed the online anomalous behavior in terms of
conforming to the law of normal systems. Previous research
shows that all normal behaviors have similar patterns in that
the probability of occurrence of number 1 is more than
number 2 and so on. This study was the first attempt to
examine the activities of automated accounts and IO in their
adherence to the law of normal systems. Our findings
indictaed that bots’ activities do not adhere to the Benford’s
law. Expectedly, the real accounts represented conformity
to the law. These results are in line with the findings of
previous research which found that Benford’s law applies to
online social networks. However, the IO activities did not
show any consistent pattern in this regard. While some
features showed conformity, some did not. These results
have implications in better understanding the malicious
online activities and contributes to the field of cyber
security. Future research will consider examining other
types of bots’ activities such as Chatbots, Webrobots, and
bots on other platforms.
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